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Abstract
This paper considers an infinite-horizon monetary economy with collateralized as-
sets. A Central Bank lends money to households by creating short- and long-term
loans. Households can deposit or borrow money on both short- and long-term matu-
rity loans. If households want to sell a financial asset, they are required to hold certain
commodities as collateral. They face a cash-in-advance constraints when buying com-
modities and financial assets.
Under Uniform or Sequential Gains to Trade Hypothesis, the existence of collateral
monetary equilibrium is ensured. I also provide some properties of equilibira, includ-
ing the liquidity trap.
Keywords: Monetary economy, liquidity constraint, collateralized asset, infinite hori-
zon, liquidity trap.
1 Introduction
In finite-time horizon models, Dubey and Geanakoplos ([DG03a], [DG03b]) have proved the
existence equilibrium for monetary economies by using Gains to Trade hypothesis (GTH).
Conversly, they have proved that monetary equilibrium for pure exchange economies with
money does not exist unless there are sufficient gains to trade (Theorem 6 and 7 in [DG03a]).
Dubey and Geanakoplos ([DG06b]) have constructed a two-period monetary economy with
production. They suppose that firms sell all goods at hand in period 2, then there is al-
ways a strictly positive quantity of commodity which is sold in the economy for that the
existence of an equilibrium holds.
This paper extends these results to an infinite horizon monetary economy with con-
sumptions, money, incomplete market, and the possibility of default on financial assets. A
Central Bank lends money to households by creating short- and long-term loans. House-
holds can deposit or borrow money in both short- and long-term by trading short-term
and long-term loans. There is a borrowing constraint in long-term loan. When selling a
commodity or an asset, tradings face a cash-in-advance constraint. If agents want to sell a
∗I would like to thank Gae¨l Giraud for his support, and Cuong Le Van, Ha-Huy Thai for their helpful
comments. All remaining errors are mine
†Email: pns.pham@gmail.com, address: Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112 Boulevard de
l’Hopital, 75013 Paris, France.
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financial asset, they are required to hold certain commodities as collateral.
The first contribution of this paper concerns the existence of monetary equilibrium.
Under a Uniform Gains to Trade Hypothesis (or Sequential Gains to Trade Hypothesis),
I prove the existence of collateral monetary equilibrium. This paper gives two versions
of equilibrium: under Uniform Gains to Trade Hypothesis, prices are uniformly bounded,
but under Sequential Gains to Trade Hypothesis, prices are only bounded for the product
topology.
Different from Bloise, Dreze and Polemarchakis [BDP05], interest rates in our model are
endogeneous.
The second contribution is Theorem 4.1 about liquidity trap which generalizes the one
in ([DG06b]. Our result says that: at some date, say t, if supply of money for short-term
is very large with respect to supply of money which agents expect to be available in the
future then the economy will fall into a liquidity trap at date t.
Literature
An excellent introduction to incomplete markets with infinite horizon can be found
in [MQ08]. By extending Geanakoplos and Zame ([GZ02]), Araujo, Pascoa and Torres-
Martinez ([APTM02]) proved the existence of equilibrium for an infinite-horizon models
with collateral requirement on buying financial assets. Kubler and Schmeider ([KS03]) have
constructed and proved the existence of Markov equilibrium in infinite-horizon asset pricing
model with incomplete markets and collateral. Such Markov equilibrium is also proved to
be a competitive equilibrium. Becker, Bosi, Le Van and Seegmuller ([BBLVS11]) proved the
existence of a Ramsey equilibrium with endogenous labor supply and borrowing constraint
on physical asset. Le Van and Pham ([LVP13]) proved the existence of intertemporal
equilibrium in an infinite horizon model with physical capital, endogenous labor supply,
financial asset with borrowing constraint in which aggregate capital and consumption may
be not uniformly bounded.
Bloise, Dreze and Polemarchakis [BDP05] have proved ”the existence of equilibria at
all overall price levels above a lower bound, provided that conditions on gains to trade, if
needed, are satisfied”.
More on liquidity trap, see Krugman [Kru98].
With the long loans of maturity of T , we refer to Magill and Quinzii ([MQ12]).
2 Model
I extend the model in Dubey and Geanakoplos ([DG03b]) to the case of infinite horizon
and add collateral constraints to financial assets.
2.1 The underlying economy
I consider an infinite horizon model with uncertainty. Time runs from t = 0 to +∞.
At each date, there are S possible exogenous states (or shocks)
S := {s1, . . . , sS}.
A node ξ is charaterized by ξ = (t, a0, a1, . . . , at) where t = t(ξ) is the date of node ξ and
a0, . . . , at ∈ S. The unique previous node of ξ is denoted by ξ−. For each T , ξ, denote
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• D is the set of all nodes. D(ξ) is the subtree with root ξ,
• DT := {ξ : t(ξ) = T} is the family of nodes with date T .
• DT (ξ) :=
T⋃
t=t(ξ)
Dt(ξ), where Dt(ξ) := DT ∩ D(ξ).
• ξ+ := {µ ∈ D(ξ) : t(µ) = t(ξ) + 1}.
A path of nodes is a sequence of nodes (ξn)
T
n=0 such that ξn+1 ∈ ξ+n for every n ≥ 0. Note
that, given ξ, there is a unique path from ξ0 to ξ, which is denoted by (ξ0, ξ1, . . . , ξ).
The set of commodities is L := {1, . . . , L}.
There are H types of consumers, h ∈ H = {1, . . . ,H}. Each agent h is equipped with an
initial vector endowment eh(ξ) ∈ RL+ of goods at each node ξ. We denote eh := (eh(ξ)ξ∈D).
Assumption (H1): For each node ξ and each h ∈ H, ‖eh(ξ)‖ > 0, where ‖eh(ξ)‖ :=
L∑`
=1
eh` (ξ). For each node ξ and each commodity ` ∈ L , e`(ξ) :=
H∑
h=1
eh` (ξ) > 0.
Each agent h has the utility function Uh(·) =
∞∑
t=0
∑
ξ∈Dt
uhξ (x
h
ξ ), where, we assume that:
Assumption (H2): uh : D → R+ is C1, concave, smooth and
uhξ (0) = 0,
∂uhξ
∂x`(ξ)
> 0 for all , ξ ∈ D, ` ∈ L, (1)
∞∑
t=0
∑
ξ∈Dt
uhξ (x
h) < +∞, for each xh ∈ RL, (2)
lim
x`(ξ)→∞
uhξ (x1, . . . , x`−1, x`(ξ), x`+1, . . . , xL) = ∞, for all ξ ∈ D. (3)
Note that, standard example of the utility function is given by the following
∞∑
t=0
βth
∑
ξ∈Dt
Ph(ξ)uh(x
h(ξ)) = Eh0
∞∑
t=0
βthuh(x
h
t ),
where uh : R+ → R+, and Ph(ξ) is the probability of node ξ under agent h’s belief.
2.2 Money
As in Dubey and Geanakoplos ([DG06b]), money is fiat and enters the economy in two ways.
At each node ξ, each agent has endowment of money mh(ξ) ≥ 0. Denote mh := mh(ξ)ξ∈D.
We call this outside money.
Assumption (H3):
m :=
∑
h
mh(ξ0) > 0 (4)
A central bank can make short loans totalling M(ξ) > 0 dollars for one period at node
ξ, and also make long loans totalling N(ξ) > 0 for two periods at node ξ.
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An agent can borrow money from the bank by promising to pay back the loan with interest.
If the interest rate for long loans is r` then anyone can borrow ν/(1+r`) dollars by promising
to repay ν dollars in the next period. There is a borrowing constraint in long-term loan,
see (b)h(ξ).
If the interest rate for short loans is rs then anyone can borrow µ/(1 + rs) dollars by
promising to repay µ) dollars at the end of the same period.
For each node ξ, denote
m(ξ) :=
H∑
h=1
mh(ξ), mˆ(ξ) :=
t(ξ)∑
n=0
m(ξn)
where (ξ0, ξ1, . . . , ξ) is the finite path whose terminal node is ξ.
The following assumption will be used to prove that prices are uniformly bounded.
Assumption (H4): For each path of nodes (ξn)
∞
n=0, we have
∞∑
n=0
m(ξn) <∞. (5)
This assumption says that the quantity of outside money in the economy is uniformly
bounded. Note that this paper gives two types of equilibrium. One type of equilibrium
with Assumption (H4) is in which prices are uniformly bounded, an other type without
Assumption (H4) is in which prices are bounded for the product topology.
2.3 Fundamental Macrovariables
The fundamental macrovariables are
η = (η(ξ))ξ∈D = (rs(ξ), r`(ξ), p(ξ))ξ∈D
where, at each node ξ
• rs(ξ) is the interest rate on short-term bank loans. One can borrow/deposit and
repay/ get back (with interest) within the same period,
• r`(ξ) is the interest rate on long-term bank loans. One can borrow/deposit and
repay/ get back (with interest) in the next note µ ∈ ξ+,
• p(ξ) ∈ RL: commodity prices,
Denote η(0, ξ) = (η(s0), . . . , η(ξ
−), η(ξ)).
2.4 Collateralized assets
There are K types of financial assets K = {1, . . . ,K}. A collaterized security is a pair
(A, c), where A = (A(η(0, ξ)))ξ∈D, with A(η(0, ξ)) ∈ RK+ , A(·) depends continuously on
η(0, ξ), and c = (ck` )k∈K,`∈L ∈ RK×L+ .
If one agent wants to sell one unit of financial asset k, she is required to hold (ck` )`∈L units
of goods.
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Assumption (H5): ∑
`∈L
ck` > 0, for all k. (6)
As in Geanakoplos and Zame (2010), the collateral requirement is the only means of
enforcing promises. Therefore, the delivery per share of security (A, c) at node ξ will be
the minimum of the face value and the value of the collateral:
dk(ξ) := min
{
Ak(η(0, ξ)), p(ξ) · ck
}
. (7)
The delivery of a portfolio α = (α1, · · · , αK) ∈ RK at note ξ is∑
k∈K
αkdk(ξ). (8)
We can now add asset prices into the fundamental macrovariable η
η := (η, pi).
2.5 Liquidity constraints for households
We define the set
∑h
η = (
∑h
ξ )ξ∈D of feasible choices of h ∈ H and the outcome of h as a
function of ξ and her strategy, σh(ξ) ∈∑hξ .
The strategy
σh(ξ) := (µh, µ˜h, νh, ν˜h, qh, q˜h, αh, α˜h)(ξ) ≥ 0
is described as follows: µh(ξ): IOUs (or short-term Bank loans) sold by h on the loan
market at node ξ, νh(ξ) : long-term Bank loans sold by h, αhk(ξ) : financial asset k ∈ K sold
by h at node ξ (recall that selling a security is borrowing), qh` (ξ) : quantity of commodity
` sold by h at node ξ, µ˜h(ξ) ≡ short-term money deposited by h, ν˜h(ξ) : long-term money
deposited by h, α˜hk(ξ) : money spent by h on asset k, q˜
h
` (ξ) : bid on h on commodity ` ∈ L
at node ξ.
The timing of trade is as follows: first, household h buys and sells bank loans; second,
she buys and sells financial assets, commodities; third, she delivers on financial assets.
Finally, she repays on loans. I describe the strategy of household h by the following
liquidity constraints: at each node ξ
(i) deposited money ≤ money on hand:
µ˜h(ξ) + ν˜h(ξ) ≤ mh(ξ) + m˜h(ξ−) (1)h(ξ)
where m˜h(ξ−) is nonnegative and represents the cash hold by household h at the end of
node ξ−.
(ii) expenditures of financial assets and commodities ≤ money unspent in (1)h(ξ) plus
money borrowed via short- and long-bonds:∑
k∈K
α˜hk(ξ) +
∑
`∈L
q˜h` (ξ) ≤ ∆(1h(ξ)) +
µh(ξ)
1 + rs(ξ)
+
νh(ξ)
1 + r`(ξ)
, (2)h(ξ)
where ∆(a) is the defference between the right-hand-side and the left-hand-side of inequal-
ity (a).
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(iii) Delivery on assets of the previous period ≤ money left in (2)h(ξ) plus money obtained
from sales of commodities, and assets
d(ξ) · αh(ξ−) ≤ ∆(2h(ξ)) + d(ξ) · α˜
h(ξ−)
pi(ξ−)
+ qh(ξ) · p(ξ) + αh(ξ) · pi(ξ). (3)h(ξ),
(iv) Repayments on loans
µh(ξ) + νh(ξ−) ≤ ∆(3h(ξ)) + (1 + rs(ξ))µ˜h(ξ) + (1 + r`(ξ−))ν˜h(ξ−) (4)h(ξ),
Moreover, we require physical constraint and borrowing constraint.
Physical constraints
eh` (ξ)− qh` (ξ) +
q˜h` (ξ)
p`(ξ)
−
∑
k∈K
ck`α
h
k(ξ) +
∑
k∈K
ck`α
h
k(ξ
−) ≥ 0 (pc)h(ξ).
Borrowing constraints on bank loans1
νh(ξ−) ≤
∑
`
eh` (ξ)p`(ξ) (b)
h(ξ)
The consumption of household h is given by
xh` (ξ) := e
h
` (ξ)− qh` (ξ) +
q˜h` (ξ)
p`(ξ)
−
∑
k∈K
ck`α
h
k(ξ) +
∑
k∈K
ck`α
h
k(ξ
−). (9)
And her money at the end of this node is
m˜h(ξ) := ∆(4)h(ξ). (10)
2.6 Monetary equilibrium
Definition 1. The collection (η, (σa)a∈H) is a collateral monetary equilibrium (CME) for
the monetary economy E =
(
(uh, eh,mh)h∈H, (A, c), (M,N)
)
, where M = (M(ξ))ξ∈D, N =
(N(ξ))ξ∈D, are stocks of money from the central bank in short- and long-term loans, re-
spectively, if
(i) All agents maximize their utility
σt ∈ arg max
σh∈Σh
Uh(xh(η, σh)),∀h ∈ H (11)
(ii) All markets clear : loans, derivatives and commodities
1
1 + rs(ξ)
∑
h∈H
µh(ξ) = M(ξ) +
∑
h
µ˜h(ξ) (12)
1
1 + r`(ξ)
∑
h
νh(ξ) = N(ξ) +
∑
h
ν˜h(ξ), (13)
pik(ξ)
∑
h
αhk(ξ) =
∑
h
α˜hk(ξ) (14)
pl(ξ)
∑
h∈H
qh` (ξ) =
∑
h∈H
q˜h` (ξ). (15)
1 If we collateralize long-term bond as we did with financial assets then the existence of equilibrium is
still ensured.
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3 The existence of equilibrium
We prove the existence of collateral monetary equilibrium by taking the limit, as T → ∞
of the sequence of equilibria of T−truncated economy ET . The difficulty is to bound all
prices. Asset prices are bounded because of collateral constraints. Thank to the next
Uniform Gains to Trade Hypothesis (UGTH), or Sequential Gains to Trade Hypothesis
(SGTH) commodity prices will be bounded as well.
3.1 Gains to Trade Hypotheses
First, by following Dubey and Geanakoplos ([DG03b]) we define non γ− Pareto optimal
allocation. Denote RL×D := {x = (x`(ξ))`∈∈L,ξ∈D : x`(ξ) ∈ R}.
Definition 2. (x1, . . . , xh) ∈ (RL×D)H is called non γ-Pareto optimal at node ξ ∈ D if
there exists τ1(ξ), · · · , τH(ξ) ∈ RL such that
H∑
h=1
τh(ξ) = 0,
τh(ξ) 6= 0, , xh(ξ) + τh(ξ) ∈ RL+, for all h ∈ H
Uh(x¯h(γ, τh(ξ))) > Uh(xh), ∀h,
where x¯h(γ, τh(ξ))`(µ) =
x
h
` (µ) if µ 6= ξ,
xh` (ξ) + min{τh` (ξ),
τh` (ξ)
1 + γ
} if µ = ξ.
Definition 3. For x = (x1, . . . , xh) ∈ (RL×D)H , we define γ(x) := sup{γ : x is not γ −
Pareto optimal at node ξ }
For each a ≥ 0, ξ ∈ D, we define the set Xa(ξ) of allocations such that a level of trade
is less than a:
Xa(ξ) :=
{
(x1, . . . , xh) ∈ (RL×D+ )H such that there exists (p, r) ∈ R(L+2)×D+ and
(α1, . . . , αH) ∈ (RK×D+ )H such that
∀µ, `
H∑
h=1
xh` (µ) +
H∑
h=1
K∑
k=1
ck`α
h
k(µ) =
H∑
h=1
eh` (µ) +
H∑
h=1
K∑
k=1
ck`α
h
k(µ
−)
∀` |xh` (ξ)− eh` (ξ)−
H∑
h=1
K∑
k=1
ck`α
h
k(ξ
−) ≤ a
}
.
We also define, for each path (ξ0, ξ1, . . . , ξ)
m¯(ξ) := max
µ∈(ξ−)+
(
mˆ(ξ)− mˆ(µ)
N(ξ−) +M(µ)
N(ξ−)
)
, (16)
µξ(m,M) :=
m¯(ξ)
M(ξ)
. (17)
Assumption (H6): (Uniform Gains to Trade Hypothesis)
There exists a > 0 such that at each node ξ ∈ D, γξ(x) > µξ(m,M) for all x ∈ Xa(ξ).
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This hypothesis requires that there exists a trade level a > 0 such that there be gains
to trade with this level at every node.
Denote
νξ(m,M) :=
mˆ(ξ) +N(ξ−)−M(ξ)
M(ξ)
.
Assumption (H7): (Sequential Gains to Trade Hypothesis)
At each node ξ, there exists a(ξ) > 0 such that at each node ξ ∈ D, γξ(x) > νξ(m,M) for
all x ∈ Xa(ξ)(ξ).
This hypothesis requires that at each node ξ, there exists a trade level a(ξ) > 0 such
that there be gains to trade with this level.
3.2 Existence of equilibrium in the economy ET
We first prove the existence of T− truncated economy ET .
Definition 4. (T-truncated economy ET ) We define ET as E but for all t > T , ηt =
σt = 0 and, at period T , there are neither trade in loans nor trades in financial assets, i.e.
νh(ξ) = ν˜h(ξ) = α˜hk(ξ) = α˜
h
k(ξ) = 0 for every h, k, and ξ ∈ DT .
Theorem 3.1. Under Assumptions (H1), (H2), (H3), (H4), (H5) and (H6), there exists a
collateral monetary equilibrium for ET . Moreover, at equilibrium, all prices are uniformly
bounded.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Theorem 3.2. Under Assumptions (H1), (H2), (H3), (H5) and (H7), there exists a col-
lateral monetary equilibrium for ET .
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Note that Assumption (H4) ensures that quantity of money at every node is uniformaly
bounded, hence prices are so. But without Assumption (H4), prices are only bounded for
the product topology.
3.3 The existence of equilibrium: infinite horizon
Theorem 3.3. Under Assumptions in Theorem 3.1 (or Theorem 3.2), there exists a col-
lateral monetary equilibrium for the infinite horizon economy.
Proof. By observing the proof of Theorem 3.1 (or Theorem 3.2), we can assume that the
sequence of equilibra (η∗,T , (σ∗h,T )h∈H) tends to (η∗, (σ∗h)h∈H) when T tends to ∞.
We will prove that (η∗, (σ∗h)h∈H) is an equilibrium of E . It is clear that condition (ii) in
Definition 1 hold. We only need to prove the optimality of plan (σ∗h)h∈H.
Denote
Σh,T = {σh : σh(ξ) = 0 ∀ξ 6∈ DT (ξ0),
and νh(ξ) = ν˜h(ξ) = α˜hk(ξ) = α˜
h
k(ξ) = 0 ∀ξ 6∈ DT (ξ0)}
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For a plan σh ∈ Σhη∗ , denote Uh,T (σh) :=
∑
ξ∈DT
uhξ (σ
h(ξ), σh(ξ−)).
Suppose that there exists a plan σ¯h ∈ Σhη∗ ,  > 0, and T1 ∈ N such that for all T ≥ T1
Uh,T (σ¯h)− Uh,T (σ∗h) > 3,∀T ≥ T1.
Note that there exists T2 > T1, σˆ
h ∈ Σhη∗ ∩ Σh,T2 such that Uh,T (σˆh)− Uh,T (σ¯h) > − and
Uh,T (σ∗h)− Uh(σ∗h) > − for all T ≥ T2. Hence, there exists σˆh ∈ Σhη∗ ∩ Σh,T2 such that
Uh,T (σˆh)− Uh(σ∗h) > ,∀T ≥ T2.
We define ψh : Σhη → Σh,T2η by ψ(σh) := {σˆh ∈ Σh,T2 : Uh,T2(σˆh)− Uh(σh) > }.
Denote Θ is the space of prices that is compact in Theorem 3.1. Define F h is a correspon-
dence from Θ× Σh to Σh,T2 by
F h(η, σh) = Σh,T2η ∩ ψh(σh).
So F h is lower semi-continuous2 with respect to the product topology.
By definition of σˆh, we see that σˆh ∈ F h(η∗, σ∗h). Combining with lim
T→∞
(η∗T , (σ∗h,T )h) =
(η∗, (σ∗h)h), there exists a sequence (σˆhT )T≥T0 ⊂ Σh,T2 such that lim
T∈∞
σˆhT = σˆ
h and σˆhT ∈
F h(η∗T , σ∗h,T ) for all T ≥ T0.
Without the generality, we can assume that T0 ≥ T2. Therefore, σˆhT0 ∈ Σ
h,T0
η∗T0 and
Uh,T2(σˆhT0)− Uh(σh,T0) > .
Hence,
Uh,T0(σˆhT0) ≥ Uh,T2(σˆhT0) > Uh(σh,T0) +  > Uh,T0(σh,T0).
This is a contradiction with the optimality of the truncated economy ET0 .
4 Some properties of equilibria
Lemma 4.1. We have ∑
h∈H,`∈L
q˜h` (ξ) +
∑
h∈H,k∈K
α˜hk(ξ)
≤
∑
h
(
mh(ξ) + m˜h(ξ−)
)
+M(ξ) +N(ξ), (18)
and
(1 + r`(ξ
−))N(ξ−) + (1 + rs(ξ))M(ξ)
≤
∑
h
(
mh(ξ) + m˜h(ξ−)
)
+M(ξ) +N(ξ). (19)
2See Pascoa and Seghir ([PS09])
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Proof. To prove (18), we use (2hξ ) and the fact that markets are clear. (19) is proved by
using (4hξ ) and the fact that markets are clear.
Proposition 4.1. At any equilibrium
(i) rs(ξ), r`(ξ) ≥ 0 for all t.
(ii) 1 + r`(ξ) ≥ min
ξ+
{(1 + rs(ξ))(1 + rs(ξ+))}. A directly consequence of this result 3 is
that r`(ξ) ≥ rs(ξ).
(iii) rs(ξ) ≤
∑
h
(
mh(ξ) + m˜h(ξ−)
)
+N(ξ)− (1 + r`(ξ−))N(ξ−)
M(ξ)
,
and r`(ξ
−) ≤
∑
h
(
mh(ξ) + m˜h(ξ−)
)
+N(ξ)− rs(ξ)M(ξ)−N(ξ−)
N(ξ−)
.
(iv) Public debt: the following result can explain the fact in monetary policy: for every
path (ξ0, ξ1, . . . , ξn), we have
n−1∑
k=0
[
r`(ξk)N(ξk) + rs(ξk)M(ξk)
]
+ rs(ξn)M(ξn) ≤ mˆ(ξn) +N(ξn), (20)
where mˆ(ξ) =
H∑
h=1
(mh(ξ0) + · · ·+mh(ξ)).
Proof. Use Lemma 4.1.
Corollary 1. Under Assumptions in Theroem 3.1, at equilibrium we have
lim
t(ξ)→∞
r`(ξ)N(ξ) + rs(ξ)M(ξ) = 0. (21)
This result implies that if the Central Bank can control all quantity of money in long
run, and the quantity of money injected by the Central Bank is uniformly bounded then
all interest rates tend to a very low level. Indeed, if if the Central Bank can control all
quantity of money in long run, then Assumption 2.2 is hold. Hence for every infinite path,
we have
∞∑
k=0
[
r`(ξk)N(ξk) + rs(ξk)M(ξk)
]
+ rs(ξn)M(ξn) <∞. (22)
Consequently, lim
n→∞ r`(ξn)N(ξn) + rs(ξn)M(ξn) = 0.
As in [DG06a], the following result shows that if agents borrow money from the bank
and do not use all the money to purchase then liquidity trap occurs.
3Generally, if we consider the long-term loans of t-period with t = 1, . . . , T then
1 + rL(T )(ξ) ≥ min
ξt1 ,...,ξta :
a∑
i=1
ti=T
a∏
i=1
(
1 + rL(ti)(ξ
t1+···+ti)
)
.
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Lemma 4.2. If µh(ξ) > 0 and rs(ξ) > 0 then ∆(2
h(ξ)) = 0.
Proof. Consider at node ξ. Assume that µh(ξ) > 0 and rs(ξ) > 0. Let h borrow  less on
short-term loan rs(ξ). This action well leave agent h with rs(ξ) more money after trade
in node ξ. Agent h can spend this amount to buy more consumption good in next node, a
contradiction.
For each monetary economy E =
(
(uh, eh,mh)h∈H, A, c,M,N
)
we denote M b(ξ) :=
m(ξ0) + · · ·+m(ξ) +N(ξ−) +N(ξ) +M(ξ). Note that the total money at node ξ is smaller
that M b(ξ), and that M b(ξ) does not depend on M(ξ−).
The following result say that if the Central Bank injects a quantity of money which is
larger than the expected quantity of money in the future then the interest rate of short-
term loan is zero. This result is consistent with those in Dubey and Geanakoplos [DG06b].
Theorem 4.1. Liquidity Trap Theorem
Consider a monetary economy E =
(
(uh, eh,mh)h∈H, A, c,M,N
)
. Consider node ξ. If
there exists a finite constant B and T > t(ξ) such that: if
M(ξ)
M b(ξ′)
> B for each ξ′ ∈
DT ∩D(ξ) then rs(ξ) = 0.
Proof. This is a consequence of Lemma 4.2 and the proofs of Theorem 3.1, and Theorem
3.2.
Since M(ξ) ≤ 1
1 + rs(ξ)
H∑
h=1
µh(ξ) then there exists h such that
µh(ξ)
1 + rs(ξ)
≥ M(ξ)/H. We
will prove that ∆(2h(ξ)) > 0 when M(ξ) is large enough.
We have ∑
`∈L
q˜h` (ξ) ≤
∑
h∈H
∑
`∈L
q˜h` (ξ) =
∑
h∈H
∑
`∈L
p`(ξ)q
h
` (ξ) ≤
∑
`∈L
∑
h∈H
p`(ξ)e`(ξ).
Lemma A.8 implies that p`(ξ) is not greater than a constant that does not depend on
M(ξ), but this constant depends on M b(ξ′). Consequently
∑`
∈L
q˜h` (ξ) is so.
By using the same argument and note that∑
k∈K
α˜hk(ξ) ≤
∑
h∈H
∑
k∈K
α˜hk(ξ) ≤
∑
k∈K
∑
h∈H
pik(ξ)α
h
k(ξ),
we see that
∑
k∈K
α˜hk(ξ) is not greater than a constant that does not depend on M(ξ). There-
fore, if M(ξ) is large enough then ∆(2h(ξ)) > 0, hence rs(ξ) = 0.
Definition 5. Constant of Liquidity Trap
A1 := inf{A : if M(ξ) > AM b(ξ′) ∀ξ′ ∈ ξ+ then rs(ξ) = 0} is called constant of liquidity
trap.
Theorem 4.1 say that this constant exists and finite. However, an other question ap-
pears: how can we estimate this contant? in pratice, we face some challenges when we
want to estimate this constant, for example we don’t know exactly M b(ξ+0 ).
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5 Conclusion and future agenda
We have constructed an infinite-time horizon monetary economy model and given a positive
answer to the question on the existence of monetary equilibirum in infinite horizon model
with incomplete financial market and liquidity constraints. Gains to Trade Hypotheses
ensure the existence of equilibrium. We have studied liquidity trap at equilibrium.
It would be interesting in future work to introduce productive sector into model and study
the impacts of liquidity constraints on strategy of firm as well as on aggregate economic
activities.
An other avenue for future research is to construct a model to analyse financial fragility
and stability. This model would include households, commercial banks, firms. We refer to
Goodhart, Sunirand, Tsomocos ([GST06]), Goodhart ([Goo06]) and Goodhart, Tsomocos
([GT10]).
A Existence of equilibrium
A.1 Proof of Theorem 3.1
We follows Dubey and Geanakoplos [DG03b].
For  > 0, h ∈ H, define the ambient strategy space of an agent of type h:
Σh =
{
(σh(ξ))ξ∈D : 0 ≤ σh(ξ) ≤ 1

}
.
These spaces are clearly convex and compact.
Given choices σ ∈ ∏
h∈H
Σh , define macrovariables η(σ) = (r, pi, p)(σ) as follow
1
1 + rs(ξ)
=
+M(ξ) +
∑
h
µ˜h(ξ)
+
∑
h
µh(ξ)
,
1
1 + r`(ξ)
=
+N(ξ) +
∑
h
ν˜h(ξ)
+
∑
h
νh(ξ)
,
pik(ξ) =
+
∑
h
α˜hk(ξ)
+
∑
h
αhk(ξ)
, p`(ξ) =
+
∑
h∈H
q˜h` (ξ)
+
∑
h∈H
qh` (ξ)
.
And the delivery is defined
d,σk (ξ) =
2
2 +
∑
h
αhk(ξ)
min
(
dk(ξ),
1

)
+
∑
h
αhk(ξ)
2 +
∑
h
αhk(ξ)
dk(ξ). (23)
The payoff to any players of type h ∈ H
Πh(σ, σh) = uh(xh). (24)
Denote Σ˜hη(σ) is defined in exactly the same manner as Σ
h
η(σ)
, but replacing dk for d,σk
Σ˜hη(σ) = Σ
h
η(σ)
(d,σk ).
Define ψ : Σ → Σ, where Σ :=
∏
h∈H
Σh , by the following
ψh (σ) = arg max
σ¯h∈Σ˜h
η(σ)
∩Σh
Πh(σ, σ¯h). (25)
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We see that all the standard assumptions are satisfied, hence there exists an  - collateral
monetary equilibrium (i.e. type-symmetric Nash equilibrium for Γ) for every  > 0.
We will prove that lim
↘0
(η(σ
), σ) = (η, σ) is an equilibrium of ET .
Lemma A.1. at every node ξ, the total commodity is uniformly bounded by a constant C
which does not depend on the quantity of money for sufficiently small .
Proof. Clear.
Lemma A.2. for every h ∈ H, ξ ∈ DT ; µt,(ξ), νt,(ξ), rs(ξ), r`(ξ) are bounded for suffi-
ciently small .
Proof. Notice that the total amount of money at a node is bounded by some constant D,
so µh,(ξ), νh,(ξ) ≤ D for all small enough .
The fact that rs(ξ), r

`(ξ) are bounded from above, is easily proved by the boundedness of
µt,(ξ), νt,(ξ)..
Remark A.1. The constant D does not depend on T , it only depends on node ξ.
Lemma A.3. rs(ξ), r

`(ξ) are non negative for sufficiently small .
Proof. Clearly.
Lemma A.4. There exists p such that p`(ξ) ≥ p for sufficiently small .
Proof. We choose H∗ such that uhξ (0, . . . , 0, H
∗, 0, . . . , 0) > Uh(C) for all h. By assumption
on outside money, there exists h ∈ H such that mh,0 ≥ m/H, so we have
p`(ξ) ≥
m
H.H∗
. (26)
Indeed, if p`(ξ) <
m
H.H∗
then let h spend m/H to buy H∗ units of commodity l at node
ξ, so h obtain a final utility ≥ uh(0, . . . , 0, H∗, 0, . . . , 0) > uh(C). Contradiction!
Lemma A.5. We have 1 + r`(ξ) ≥ min
µ∈ξ+
(1 + rs(ξ))1 + r

s(µ) at each node ξ.
Proof. Clear.
Lemma A.6. At each final node ξ ∈ DT (ξ0), for path (ξ0, ξ1, . . . , ξ) we have
rs(ξ0)M(ξ0) + r

`(ξ0)N(ξ0) + · · ·+ rs(ξ−)M(ξ−) + r`(ξ−)N(ξ−) + rs(ξ)M(ξ) ≤ mˆ(ξ) +B,
where mˆ(ξ) =
H∑
h=1
(mh(ξ0) + · · ·+mh(ξ)), and B is a constant which depends on ξ.
Proof.
Denote µξ(m,M) :=
1
M(ξ)
(
mˆ(ξ)− min
µ∈(ξ−)+
mˆ(µ)
M(µ) +N(ξ−)
N(ξ−)
)
.
Lemma A.7. Given ξ− ∈ DT−1(ξ0), then there exists a final node ξ ∈ DT (ξ0) such that
rs(ξ) ≤ mˆ(ξ)
M(ξ) +N(ξ−)
≤ µξ(m,M). (27)
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Proof. Given ξ− ∈ DT−1(ξ0). Since Lemma A.5, there exists ξ ∈ (ξ−)+ such that 1+rl (ξ) ≥
(1 + rs(ξ
−))(1 + rs(ξ)). Hence rl (ξ) ≥ rs(ξ−) + rs(ξ). Lemma A.6 implies that
rs(ξ
−)(N(ξ−) +N(ξ)) + rs(ξ)(N(ξ
−) +M(ξ)) ≤ mˆ(ξ) +B.
Consequently, rs(ξ) ≤
mˆ(ξ) +B
N(ξ−) +M(ξ)
. Let →, we obtain rs(ξ) ≤
mˆ(ξ)
N(ξ−) +M(ξ)
.
On the other hand, definition of µξ(m,M) implies that
µξ(m,M) =
1
M(ξ)
(
mˆ(ξ)− min
µ∈(ξ−)+
mˆ(µ)
M(µ) +N(ξ−)
N(ξ−)
)
(28)
≥ 1
M(ξ)
(
mˆ(ξ)− mˆ(ξ)
M(ξ) +N(ξ−)
N(ξ−)
)
=
mˆ(ξ)
M(ξ) +N(ξ−)
. (29)
Lemma A.8. At final node ξ ∈ DT (ξ0), if rs(ξ) ≤ µξ(m,M) then for each µ in the path
(ξ0, ξ1, . . . , ξ), and ` ∈ L
p`(µ) <
M b(ξ)
a
max(1,
H∗H
e(µ)
), (30)
Proof. Consider a final node ξ ∈ DT (ξ0). Suppose that rs(ξ) ≤ µξ(m,M).
Assume for each ` ∈ L, p`(ξ) ≥ M
b(ξ)
a
then a ≥ M
b(ξ)
p`(ξ)
≥ q˜
h
` (ξ)
p`(ξ)
− qh` (ξ).
If
q˜h` (ξ)
p`(ξ)
− qh` (ξ) < −a then qh` (ξ) > a, so p`(µ) <
M b(ξ)
a
, contradiction. If
q˜h` (ξ)
p`(ξ)
− qh` (ξ) ≥
−a then q˜
h
` (ξ)
p`(ξ)
− qh` (ξ) ∈ [−a, a]. Consequently,
|xh` (ξ)− eh` (ξ)−
∑
k
ck`α
h
k(ξ
−)| = | q˜
h
` (ξ)
p`(ξ)
− qh` (ξ)| ≤ a.
It means that x = (x1, . . . , xh) ∈
(
RL×D
T
+
)H
belongs to Xa(ξ).
Uniform Gains to Trade Hypothesis implies that γξ(x) > µξ(m,M). Combining with
Lemma A.7, we get γξ(x) > rs(ξ). By definition of γξ(x), there exists γ > rs(ξ) such that
x is not γ - Pareto optimal at node ξ. Therefore, there exists τ(ξ) = (τh(ξ))h∈H ∈ RL×H
such that
τh(ξ) 6= 0, for all h ∈ H, and
H∑
h=1
τh(ξ) = 0, (31)
xh(ξ) + τh(ξ) ∈ RL+, for all h ∈ H, (32)
Uh(x¯h(γ, τh(ξ))) > Uh(xh), for all h ∈ H. (33)
Since
H∑
h=1
τh(ξ) = 0, there exists i ∈ H such that p(ξ)τ i(ξ) ≤ 0. Without the generality,
we can assume that τ i(ξ) = (τ i1(ξ), . . . , τ
i
m(ξ),−τ im+1(ξ), . . . ,−τ iL(ξ)), with τ i`(ξ) ≥ 0. We
have
m∑`
=1
p`(ξ)τ
i
`(ξ) ≤
L∑
`=m+1
p`(ξ)τ
i
`(ξ).
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2013.55
Monetary equilibrium - N.S. Pham 15
We construct a new strategy (σˆi(µ))µ∈DT of agent i as the following: σˆi(µ) = σi(µ), ∀µ 6=
ξ and at node ξ
µˆi(ξ) := µi(ξ) +
m∑
`=1
p`(ξ)τ
i
`(ξ),
ˆ˜qi`(ξ) := q˜
i
`(ξ) + p`(ξ)
τ i`(ξ)
1 + γ
, ∀` = 1, . . . ,m
qˆi`(ξ) := q
i
`(ξ) + τ
i
`(ξ), ∀` = m+ 1, . . . , L.
Since xi(ξ) + τ i(ξ) ∈ RL+, then this new trategy satisfies the physical constraint (pc)h(ξ).
Thank to γaξ (x) > rs(ξ), then
1
1 + γ
<
1
1 + rs(ξ)
, hence liquidity constraint (2i(ξ)) is hold.
Liquidity constraint (4i(ξ)) is satisfied because of
m∑`
=1
p`(ξ)τ
i
`(ξ) ≤
L∑
`=m+1
p`(ξ)τ
i
`(ξ).
On the other hand U i(x¯i(γ, τ i(ξ))) > U i(xi), contradiction to the optimality of σi.
We now consider a node µ in the path (ξ0, ξ1, . . . , ξ). Let k ∈ L. Since
H∑
h=1
ehk(µ) ≥ e(µ),
there exists h such that ehk(ξ) ≥ e(µ)/H.
If
pk(µ)
p`(ξ)
>
2H∗H
e(µ)
. Let h do nothing, just sell e(µ)/(2H) units of commodity k, obtain
pk(µ)e(µ)/(2H) dollars. Hence h can buy at leastH
∗ units of commodity `, contradiction.
Therefore,
pk(µ)
p`(ξ)
≤ 2H
∗H
e(µ)
, so we obtain (30)
Lemma A.9. Price of financial asset k at node ξ: pik(ξ) is bounded from above if com-
modity prices p`(ξ) are bounded from above.
Proof. Choose h withmh0 > m/h. Let h usesm
h
0 to buy a vector of commodities (
mh0
p`(ξ)L
)`∈L,
at initial node in order to use these commodities as collateral at node ξ. So at note ξ, h
can sell at least w = min
`:ck`>0
{ mh0
p¯ck`L
}
> 0 units of asset k and obtain wpik(ξ) dollars. Of
course, wpik(ξ) ≤ p¯H∗. Thus pik(ξ) ≤ p¯H∗/w.
Lemma A.10. Let ξ as in Lemma A.7, we have
rs(ξ0)M(ξ0) + r`(ξ0)N(ξ0) + · · ·+ rs(ξ−)M(ξ−) + r`(ξ−)N(ξ−) + rs(ξ)M(ξ) = mˆ(ξ). (34)
Proof. Similarly Claim V in Dubey and Geanakoplos [DG03b].
Lemma A.11. At each final node ξ, we have rs(ξ) ≤ µs(m,M)
Proof. Assume there is a final node ξ at which rs(ξ) > µs(m,M). Then
M(ξ)rs(ξ) + min
µ∈(ξ−)+
mˆ(µ)
M(µ) +N(ξ−)
N(ξ−) > mˆ(ξ).
Lemma A.6 implies that
rs(ξ0)M(ξ0) + r`(ξ0)N(ξ0) + · · ·+ rs(ξ−)M(ξ−) + r`(ξ−)N(ξ−) + rs(ξ)M(ξ) ≤ mˆ(ξ).
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Hence
min
µ∈(ξ−)+
mˆ(µ)
M(µ) +N(ξ−)
N(ξ−) > rs(ξ0)M(ξ0) + r`(ξ0)N(ξ0) + · · ·+ rs(ξ−)M(ξ−) + r`(ξ−)N(ξ−).
Let µ ∈ (ξ−)+ be as in Lemma A.7, i.e, rs(µ) ≤ mˆ(µ)
M(µ) +N(ξ−)
then
min
µ∈(ξ−)+
mˆ(µ)
M(µ) +N(ξ−)
N(ξ−) + rs(µ)M(µ)
≤ mˆ(µ)
M(µ) +N(ξ−)
N(ξ−) + rs(µ)M(µ)
≤ mˆ(µ)
M(µ) +N(ξ−)
N(ξ−) +
mˆ(µ)
M(µ) +N(ξ−)
M(µ) = mˆ(µ).
Consequently, we get
mˆ(µ) > rs(ξ0)M(ξ0) + r`(ξ0)N(ξ0) + · · ·+ rs(ξ−)M(ξ−) + r`(ξ−)N(ξ−) + rs(µ)M(µ),
contradiction to Lemma A.10.
Lemma A.12. All prices are bounded from above.
Proof. This is a direct sequence of the above results.
Lemma A.13. d,σk (ξ, η) = dk(ξ, η) for sufficiently small .
Proof. By collateral constraints, dk(ξ) is bounded. Consequently we get d
,σ
k (ξ, η) =
dk(ξ, η) for sufficiently small .
Lemma A.14. We have αhk(ξ) is bounded from above.
Proof. By collateral constraints, we get
c
∑
k
αh,k (ξ) ≤
∑
k
[∑
`
ck`
]
αh,k (ξ) ≤
∑
`
eh` (ξ) ≤ e¯.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 3.2
I use the same method in the proof of Theorem 3.1. However, in order to prove that all
prices are bounded when → 0, I use Sequential Gains to Trade Hypothesis.
At each node ξ ∈ DT (ξ0), consider path (ξ0, ξ1, . . . , ξ). Let denote m˜(ξ) :=
h∑
h=1
m˜h(ξ) be
the total stock of money unspent at the end of node ξ. Then we have
m˜(ξ) := m˜(ξ−) +m(ξ) +N(ξ) +M(ξ)− (1 + r`(ξ−))N(ξ−)− (1 + rs(ξ))M(ξ)
= · · ·
= mˆ(ξ) +N(ξ)− rs(ξ)M(ξ)
−rs(ξ−)M(ξ−)− r`(ξ−)N(ξ−)− · · · − rs(ξ0)M(ξ0)− r`(ξ0)N(ξ0)
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Since markets clear, we have
rs(ξ)M(ξ) ≤
∑
h
µh(ξ)−M(ξ)
≤ m(ξ) + m˜(ξ−)−M(ξ)
≤ mˆ(ξ) +N(ξ)−M(ξ).
Therefore, rs(ξ) ≤ mˆ(ξ) +N(ξ)−M(ξ)
M(ξ)
< γξ(x) for all x ∈ Xa(ξ)(ξ). By using the same
argument in Lemma A.8, we obtain that all commodity prices are bounded from above,
and so financial asset prices.
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